Property Assistance Corp., a Utah corporation v. Douglas C. Roberts and Betty J. Roberts : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1987
Property Assistance Corp., a Utah corporation v.
Douglas C. Roberts and Betty J. Roberts : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
M. David Eckersley, Esq.; Houpt & Eckersley; Attorneys for Appellants.
Ellen Maycock; Kruse, Landa & Maycock; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Property Assistance Corp. v. Douglas C. Roberts and Betty J. Roberts, No. 870489 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/678
BRIEF 
JTAH 
)OCUMENT 
;FU 
0 
MO 
HS^NO. *70WK* 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROPERTY ASSISTANCE CORP., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS C. ROBERTS and 
BETTY J. ROBERTS, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
Case No 870489-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENTlOF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE 
M. David Eckersley, Esq. 
Houpt & Eckersley 
419 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Ellen Maycock 
Kruse. Landa &|Maycock 
620 Kearns Building 
136 South MainlStreet 
SaltLake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent w ^i ^ 1 
FFB 8 1938 
870489 -Ok 
< i JF APPEALS 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROPERTY ASSISTANCE CORP., ) 
a Utah corporation, 
) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, Case Nol. 870489-CA 
) 
vs. 
) 
DOUGLAS C. ROBERTS and 
BETTY J. ROBERTS, ) 
Defendants/Appellants. ) 
) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT! OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE 
M. David Eckersley, Esq. Ellen Maycock 
Houpt & Eckersley Kruse, Landa &j Maycock 
419 Boston Building 620 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 136 South Mainl Street 
Attorneys for Appellants Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 1 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS . . . . 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 5 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED A DECREE OF 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 6 
II. THIS APPEAL IS NOW MOOT 9 
EI. IF THE TRIAL COURT HAD NOT GRANTED SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE, PROPERTY ASSISTANCE WOULD BE 
ENTITLED TO RECOVER FROM THE ROBERTS THE 
AMOUNTS IT PAID TO PREVENT FORECLOSURE OF THE 
SECOND MORTGAGE ON THE ROBERTS' RESIDENCE 10 
CONCLUSION 13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 14 
ADDENDUM 15 
-i 
CASES CITED 
Brusco v. Brusco, 407 P.2d 645 (Ore. 1965) , 12 
Cillessen v. Kona Company, 73 N.M. 297, 387 P.2d 867 (1964) 8 
Commercial Fixtures & Furnishings, Inc. v Adams, 
564 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977) 12 
Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Utah 1974) 9 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Company, 
659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983) 10 
Hertz v. Fiscus, 98 Idaho 456, 567 P.2d 1 (1977) 12 
Kershaw v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Company. 561 P.2d (Utah 1977) 11 
McNulty v. Copp, 271 P.2d 90 (Cal.App. 1954) 11 
Nance v. Schoonover, 520 P.2d 896 (Utah 1974) 8 
Otteson v. Malone, 584 P.2d 878 (Utah 1978) 9 
Shumway v. Earley, 106 P.2d 194 (Ariz. 1940) 12 
T. W. Anderson Mortgage Co. v. Robert Land Co , 
480 P.2d 109 (Colo.App. 1970) 8 
Tabata v. Murane, 148 P.2d 605 (Cal. 1944) 11,12 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITEjD 
Restatement of Restitution, § 112 , 11 
- i i -
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROPERTY ASSISTANCE CORP., ) 
a Utah corporation, 
) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, Case Not 870489-CA 
) 
vs. 
) 
DOUGLAS C. ROBERTS and 
BETTY J. ROBERTS, ) 
Defendants/Appellants. ) 
) 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of spiecific performance entered 
by the Third District Court on June 23, 1987. On November 2, 1987, the case was 
poured over to the Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Appellants assert that the issues are whether an option must be exercised in 
accordance with its terms and whether a party who pajys the debt of another is 
entitled to recover the amount of such payment. Respondent disagrees with that 
statement of issues. A review of the findings of fact and Conclusions of law entered 
by the trial court provides no basis for appellants' statement of the issues. The trial 
court did not find that an option existed, or that any option had been exercised; 
whether in conformity with its terms or otherwise. Nor did the trial court find that 
either party should recover the amount of a payment made on behalf of the other 
party. 
Respondent asserts that the issues before this court afe: 
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(1) Whether the trial court erred in granting specific performance of a 
contract between Property Assistance Corp. and Douglas C. and Betty J. 
Roberts; and 
(2) Whether this appeal is moot. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Respondent agrees with appellants* statement that there are no constitutional 
or statutory provisions whose interpretation is determinative of the issues presented 
by this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for enforcement of a contract by specific performance, or in the 
alternative, for damages. The case was tried to the court on June 16, 1987. 
Appellants did not present evidence. The trial court entered findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a judgment and decree of specific performance. This appeal 
followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-respondent Property Assistance Corp. ("Property Assistance") is a 
Utah corporation in the business of real estate investment, particularly investment 
in distressed properties. (Trial transcript pp. 11-12, Record at 000153-4.) 
In January of 1986, William J. Oelerich, president and operating officer of 
Property Assistance, learned that defendants-appellants Douglas C. and Betty J. 
Roberts (the "Roberts") had defaulted in payments due on a note and second trust 
deed encumbering their home located at 8021 Erique Way in Sandy, Utah. The 
Roberts had failed to cure the default and their house was scheduled to be sold at a 
trustee's sale on February 5, 1986. (Exhibit 1-P.) The note was in the approximate 
amount of $40,000 and was owed to Tracy Collins Bank & Trust ("Tracy Collins"). 
9. 
Oelerich contacted the Roberts on behalf of Property Assistance and negotiated 
an agreement. On February 2, 1986, the parties entered into an agreement (the 
"Agreement"), a copy of which appears in the addendum to this brief as Exhibit " 1 " . 
The Agreement between Property Assistance and the Roberts contained the 
following provisions: 
(1) That Property Assistance would pay thelRoberts $2,000 at the time 
the Agreement was executed; 
(2) That Property Assistance would market Ithe Roberts' home at a fair 
market price. When the house was sold, Property Assistance would pay the 
Roberts 25% of the net proceeds of sale; 
(3) That Property Assistance would assume responsibility for the first 
and second mortgages (the obligation to Tracy Collins) until the house was 
sold; and 
(4) That the Roberts would continue to occupy the house and pay rent to 
Property Assistance until the house was sold. 
At the time of the execution of the Agreement, Property Assistance paid $2,000 to 
the Roberts. (Trial transcript p. 45, Record at 000157.) At the time the parties 
entered into the Agreement, there were two obligations on the Roberts' home 
secured by trust deed; a first mortgage in favor of First Federal Savings & Loan and 
the second mortgage in favor of Tracy Collins.1 
After the Agreement was signed, Oelerich contacted Tracy Collins to make 
arrangements to forestall the trustee sale. Property Assistance deposited $40,000 
l The obligations secured by the Roberts' home are referred to for convenience as 
mortgages, even though the obligations were secured qy trust deeds. 
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with Tracy Collins and Tracy Collins agreed to postpone its trustee sale. If, however, 
the transaction were not completed within 21 days, Property Assistance would 
forfeit $5,000 to Tracy Collins as liquidated damages. (Exhibit 4-P, Trial transcript 
p. 16, Record at 000158.) 
The Roberts' house was also subject to a first mortgage in favor of First Federal 
Savings & Loan. Property Assistance secured the approval of First Federal for its 
assumption of this loan. (Trial transcript p. 17, Record at 000159-60.) 
On February 7, 1986, the Roberts signed a document entitled "Extension of 
Option" providing that the time period set forth in the original agreement would be 
extended until February 26, 1986. (Exhibit 7-P, Trial transcript p. 20, Record at 
000162.) 
Prior to the time that the Roberts had signed their initial agreement with 
Property Assistance, their house had been listed for sale with a realtor, Eagar & 
Company. Property Assistance continued that listing by entering into a listing 
agreement with Eagar & Company on February 10,1986. 
On February 13, 1986, Property Assistance accepted an offer to purchase the 
property from David and Vicki Hill. The purchase price was to be $82,500. (Exhibit 
8-P, Trial transcript p. 22, Record at 000164.) 
During February of 1986, Oelerich, acting on behalf of Property Assistance, 
informed the Roberts of all the steps he was taking with respect to the sale of the 
property, including his agreement with Tracy Collins, listing the property for sale, 
and acceptance of the offer to purchase the property. 
On February 21, 1986, Property Assistance paid off the second mortgage in 
favor of Tracy Collins in the amount of $40,069.87. At that time, Tracy Collins 
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executed a full reconveyance of its trust deed. (Trial transcript pp. 29-30, Record at 
000171-2.) 
During February of 1986, Oelerich, on behalf of Property Assistance, also 
discussed with Roberts the desirability of avoiding two closings, tha t is, a 
conveyance of the property to Property Assistance and then a second conveyance of 
the property from Property Assistance to the purchasers,,David and Vicki Hill. The 
Roberts indicated that they agreed that two closings should be avoided. (Finding of 
Fact no. 11, Trial transcript pp. 24-35, Record at 000166-71.) 
On February 22, 1986, Oelerich met with the Roberts concerning a further 
extension of the Agreement between Property Assistance and the Roberts. Betty 
Roberts signed an agreement to extend the Agreement to April 18, 1986, but 
Douglas Roberts refused to do so, seeking instead to change the terms of the 
Agreement to increase his percentage of sale proceeds., (Trial transcript p. 29, 
Record at 000171.) 
On February 26,1986, the Roberts paid Property Assistance the sum of $500.00 
representing rent on the property for the month of February. On March 14, 1986, 
Property Assistance paid the first mortgage holder, First! Federal Savings & Loan, 
the sum of $368.90 to bring payments on the first mortgage on the property current. 
After February 26, 1986, the Roberts paid no more amounts as rent or 
otherwise to Property Assistance and refused to perform uiftder the Agreement. 
SUMMARY OK ARGUMENT^ 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED S P E C I F I C 
PERFORMANCE OF THE AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 2,1986. 
As the trial court found, the Agreement between the parties was not a "true" 
option. The trial court properly found that the agreement between the parties was 
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the equivalent of an earnest money agreement and thus was capable of being 
specifically performed. 
II. THIS APPEAL IS NOW MOOT. 
The Roberts never posted a supersedeas bond in this matter. Despite numerous 
efforts on their part to avoid implementation of the decree, including filing 
bankruptcy, the Roberts were eventually unable to avoid the consequences of the 
court's judgment and decree. At this time, the Roberts have deeded the property over 
to Property Assistance and have surrendered possession. Property Assistance is 
proceeding with the provisions of the decree of specific performance and is marketing 
the house for sale. Property Assistance has also assumed the financial burdens 
associated with the property. Thus, it would be impossible to return the parties to 
their status before the decree was entered and the appeal is moot. 
HI. IF THE TRIAL COURT HAD NOT GRANTED SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE, PROPERTY ASSISTANCE WOULD BE 
ENTITLED TO RECOVER FROM THE ROBERTS THE 
AMOUNTS IT PAID TO TRACY COLLINS TO PREVENT 
FORECLOSURE. 
The issue whether the Roberts were unjustly enriched is not properly before the 
court. However, in the event the court wishes to consider this issue, if a decree of 
specific performance were not entered, Property Assistance would be entitled to a 
judgment for the amounts it paid to Tracy Collins on the theory of unjust 
enrichment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED A DECREE OF 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
The Roberts' entire argument with respect to Property Assistance's failure to 
exercise its option in strict conformity with its terms is premised on their contention 
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t ha t the Agreement between the part ies was an "option"1 in the normal sense of t h a t 
word. Tha t contention ignores the actuti! termsnf the Agreemer* :• th-- «.*nse. 
Under an-r-J':-..-.: .• -• ? • ; - , * : . , ; - , > ; i -
 :« r a specified aiin.uiii in . -t u,n ",y* 
the ri^ht to pi r :nase partn mar real property at a certain price within a certain time 
period. Usual ly, the buyer must exercise the option in a [specific manner ; that i; 
mus t give notice to the seller *' • . J.IM ;• - property within ;..-/ 
specified, time period ' Fhe upturn tlum "ripens" into an agreement for the purchase of 
real property. 
In th i s case, s eve ra l e l e m e n t s of :; 1 • ; a = ' ^ i n i , a: . *,t 
imporlai.i l>, m> puichas*1 price was specified in the Agreement. No time for closing 
of the purchase was set forth. No date for possession of the property was included. 
ObviousK then, the part ies intended something here different fron 1 a ty pica! option 
agreement . 
Under the Agreement, Property Assistance had the fbllowing obligations: 
To pay $2,000 to the Roberts; 
1
 m;iloj iho first mortgage payment; 
. ) prevent the second mortgage holder from foreclosing; and 
-• I'o marke t the property. 
The Roberts' obligations were to oeci ipy the pi operty and to pay rent unt i l the 
propei ty v • .0 n third pa rty. When the sale to thel third party occurred, the 
part ies would share the proceeds in the manner set forth ir} the Agreement . 
The trial court concluded tha t the Agreement was not a i n le option h\ it the 
••''j:i:'/:ii:i!i' •>' • . '',:i!;i-- : m<.-ney receipt and offer u-- purchase winch was accepted by 
the Roberts, i he trial court also concluded tha t pursuan t to the Agreement , the 
price of the property was $40,069.87 (the amoun t neeesban to p;iy the second 
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mortgage to Tracy Collins), plus the balance on the first mortgage to First Federal 
Savings & Loan, plus the $2,000 paid to the Roberts at the time of the execution of 
the Agreement, plus 25% of the net proceeds of the sale of the property. 
The cases cited in the Roberts' brief in support of their argument that the terms 
of an option must be strictly complied with involve different kinds of contracts. For 
example, T. W. Anderson Mortgage Co. v. Robert Land Co., 480 P.2d 109 (Colo.App. 
1970) involved a contract for the sale of 50 acres of land. There were successive 
options for the purchase of additional land. The buyer had exercised several options 
and attempted to exercise an additional option. The court held that, because the 
option required written exercise, oral exercise of the option was not effective. 
In Nance v. Schoonover, 521 P.2d 896 (Utah 1974), the parties had entered into 
an option agreement which allowed the buyers to purchase the property for an 
agreed price of $18,000, $17,000 of which must be in cash. One day prior to the 
expiration of the option period, the buyers notified the defendants of their intent to 
exercise the option and their intent to pay $17,000 by personal check. The seller had 
refused to accept tender by personal check and the court held that, because the 
agreement required payment in cash, the tender by personal check did not comply 
with the terms of the agreement. 
In Cillessen v. Kona Company, 73 N.M. 297, 387 P.2d 867 (1964), the buyers 
had an option to purchase an undivided one-half interest in certain land for a period 
of 120 days for a sum certain. The option required that it be exercised in writing and 
the court enforced that requirement. 
Each of these cases involved a typical option, that is, one where there is a 
definite purchase price and the object of the contract is to give the buyer the right to 
buy the property at a certain price within a certain time frame. In the present case, 
8-
there v-'.i:- ;.- .- : ;:,'•. purchase price, ! lie object of the -"ontraet was n<<: to allow 
Property Assistance tu buy the property fivn. the Roberts within a certain t ime 
period for a certain price. The object -•! ' .<-.•..!!:•• >• * *va- tn nr^vem .<•:* rlosure of the 
secor . - r t ^ j ^ c -n .a-, property and ah ;w the property Ito be sold to a third par ty so 
t h a t both Property Assistance and the Roberts could benefit. 
The trial court's finding tha t this was not ;i I rue option agreement is clenrly 
si.( . •'•••:• a i - \ l -• - ' - i i • in ai w iii L correctly applied the s tandards 
fta* de termining whether specific performance shou !(i be granted. The U tah Supreme 
Court has said tha t specific performance is an eo iutable remedy Fisc' .•-/-• n, 
525 P.2d 45 :,•••*"•< , neiher to gnant specific performance, a 
court should examine the agreement to be specifically enforced and de t e rmine 
whe ther there exist equitable grounds to grant specific performance Otteson v. 
Malone, 584 P.2d 878 (Utah P>78). In lliis case, tin1 lioberts were three days away 
• * -• • in-iri^ ;;.< w home to foreclosure and had no fundi with which to pay Tracy 
Collins. Property Assistance made it possible for the Roberts to reside in the home 
from February of 1986 until J anuarv <»( l!*«s,S, w nhuiil a 'second mortgage payment . 
Clear vva- equitable for the trial court to gran t specific performance of the 
Agreement and the Roberts have not argued to the contrary. Thus, the t r ial court 
dui not err in g ran t ing specific performance. 
1 I ' T h A L -; 11" fl 1 I' i»l U L v M i ' ^ i I- * s ivmrvn 
T.ne iriai o.mrt set the amount of the supersedeas bond to be filed in the event of 
an appeal at $85,000. The Roberts failed to file such a tyond Instead, the\ filed a 
bankruptcy nr ^-eduuc !-n- • • - na ' • e effect of the trial court's decree. 
The bankruptcy court granled Property Assistance 's moti-m for relief from the 
au toma t i c s tay. Thereaf ter , the Rober ts conveyed the pr<a . • * ! • j r " / 
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Assistance by quit claim deed and ultimately surrendered possession of the property 
to Property Assistance. (Affidavits of Ellen Maycock and William J. Oelerich.) 
In Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Company, 659 P.2d 1040 
(Utah 1983), the court indicated that "An appeal is moot if during the pendency of 
the appeal circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated, thereby 
rendering the relief requested impossible or of no legal effect." 659 P.2d at 1043. In 
this case, the Roberts have conveyed the property at issue to Property Assistance and 
have surrendered possession of the property. Property Assistance, in accordance 
with the decree of specific performance, is marketing the property for sale and 
paying the financial obligations associated with the property. It is impossible to 
return the parties to the positions they occupied before entry of the decree of specific 
performance and this appeal is therefore moot. 
III. IF THE TRIAL COURT HAD NOT GRANTED SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE, PROPERTY ASSISTANCE WOULD BE 
ENTITLED TO RECOVER FROM THE ROBERTS THE 
AMOUNTS IT PAID TO PREVENT FORECLOSURE OF THE 
SECOND MORTGAGE ON THE ROBERTS'RESIDENCE. 
The trial court found that Property Assistance was entitled to specific 
performance of the Agreement with the Roberts. Thus, the trial court did not reach 
the question of whether Property Assistance was entitled to recover from the Roberts 
the $40,000 Property Assistance paid to Tracy Collins to prevent the trustee sale of 
the Roberts' property. For that reason, that issue is not properly before this court. 
In the event that this court determines to consider that issue, however, it is 
Property Assistance's position that it would be entitled to recover the amount it paid 
to Tracy Collins from the Roberts on the theory of unjust enrichment. 
The Roberts and Property Assistance entered into the Agreement on 
February 2, 1986. The trustee sale of the Roberts' home was scheduled for 
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V *nr.. <>- r> " ^ - , - " p i ! . a t e action was required to prevent foreclosure, Oelerich 
contacted Tracy Collins and deposited funds necessary to induce Tracy Collins not to 
proceed with the sale. If Oelerich had not done so, the sale w« :<; l - :'MO ode<: i-.f. 
the Roberts • / • -f-*-r = 1 ne Agreement depended upon Property 
Assistance's prevent ing the trustee sale. 
For tha t reason, it is absurd for the Roberts to argue, u> in* * : ' ! i, 
t ha t Property Ass i s t an t 'no-'- •* - •.». n> n ' -acy 'Cohim- "'.u.unLa: . / . * d 
w i t h o u t r e q u e s t from mcin . i ' roper ty Ass i s t ance was obl iga ted unde r i^e 
Agreement to prevent foreclosure and it was the parties ' itatent tha t it du s<* 
Section 1 II? t^f tho Rt^taLPHUMH nl' Restitution doe's not support the Roberts ' 
position, Tha t section <IL\I1.^ with a situation where a person confers a benefit upon 
another "officiously". Property Assistance, acting in accoirdance with its Agreement 
with the Roberts, could har«; ;\ ''u- ()••• in.-r :, J :,\. ' M ^ / Tficiously. 
Mua-i^iT none ol* ,ne cases cited o\ * h» RohrrU involve p a y m e n t s m a d e 
pu r suan t to an agreement . Kershaw v. Tracy Collins Ba\nk & Trust Company, 561 
P.2d 683 (Utah P)77 ' involved a situation w ln-i *'- . .i : o : n \ . - ; - \ * * t-*: services 
\<-i'L*>j:.* * J - •- ationship with het deceased husband. There was no 
agreement tha t the plaintiff would receive re imbursement for the services. The 
court said t ha t "Services rendered gratuitously and withoir -xp* ^ne * I 
par t ies t ha t comptn'i-oi; n *•- • ••<: !*•..:.- i unpen ,..!>.. . / d . at 685. 
Likewise, in McNulty v. Copp, 271 P.2d 90 (Cal.App. 1954) the court held tha t , 
when a party had been in possession of the property wrongfully nnd !;: ! n;-..d v-\*s 
and the cost <S r* n\'v~ ;,5> ;,;i. : rltjM >-u -i >• v/-i- c • --n/o i-< .;fi >,*._• i ::iobC expenses 
against a r .^o - JI uorwise due to other parties, in Tabatfy v. Miirane, 148 P.2d 605 
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(Cal. 1944), the issue was whether certain monies advanced by plaintiff to a decedent 
were loans or voluntary payments. 
In Shurnway v. Farley, 106 P.2d 194 (Ariz. 1940), the issue was whether the 
defendants in a quiet title action could recover taxes they paid on lots in which the 
court found they had no interest. No agreement was involved. In Brusco v. Brusco, 
407 P.2d 645 (Ore. 1965), the issue was whether a property owner could recover a 
cotenant's share of expenses. Again, no agreement was involved. 
Commercial Fixtures & Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977) 
arose from the efforts of the plaintiff to recover from a landlord the value of materials 
furnished by the plaintiff to a tenant and incorporated into a building on the leased 
premises. There was no agreement between the landlord and the plaintiff. 
None of the cases cited by the Roberts in support of their argument that 
Property Assistance would not be entitled to recover the amounts it paid to Tracy 
Collins to prevent foreclosure of the Roberts' second mortgage has any factual 
similarity to the present case. More importantly, in none of those cases was there 
any agreement between the party conferring the benefit and the party benefiting. 
In Hertz v. Fiscus, 98 Idaho 456, 567 P.2d 1 (1977), the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that "The essence of the quasi-contractual theory of unjust enrichment is that 
the defendant has received a benefit which would be inequitable to retain at least 
without compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention is unjust." 567 P.2d 
at 2 (citations omitted). 
In this case, the Roberts have had the benefit of Property Assistance's payment 
of a $40,000 second mortgage. If Property Assistance had not paid the second 
mortgage, the Roberts' house would have been sold at a trustee sale in 1986. Under 
the Agreement, Property Assistance had the obligation to prevent foreclosure. Thus, 
-12-
it would be inequitable to allow the Roberts to retain the benefit of Property 
Assistance's payment without recovery from the Roberts. 
UUiNULUSlON 
: - MV, • :ik d b\ the Roberts raises issues that weife not before the trial court. 
Since the trial ct uirt f< uind that the Agreement was nd>t a win* ^ptiwn, it did not 
consider whether an option mi isl be exercised • •:• • :* - its terms. 
Likewise, because the trial court granted specific performance, it did not consider 
whether Property Assistance was entitled to recover the amounts it spent to prevent 
foreclosure of the Roberts' second mortgage. 
! - >r< :• n< p«"-Mrmance is an equitable remedy, It was entirely appropriate 
for the trial court to grant specific performance of the contract between the parties. 
The Roberts' entire course of conduct indicates that their -:,\i-\i\ A. • . ui.. a 
benefit in excess of *?•-;«) :!ii; performance of th^ir obligation^ under the 
Agreement. Further, since the Roberts failed to file a supersedeas bond nnd the 
provisions of the decree of specific performance have b^gun to go ••• •-• * h-s 
appeal is n-v; >*.-..' .•-..! should he dismissed. 
I • : i- ii^ day of February, 1988. 
KRUSE, LANIDA & MAYCOCK 
A Professional Corporation 
620 Kearns Building 
136 South Mainl Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
'ELLEN MA YCOCK 
Attorneys fo|r Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the following person, postage prepaid, this 5th day 
ofFebruary, 1988: 
M. David Eckersley, Esq. 
Houpt & Eckersley 
419 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
Agreement of February 2s 1986 
a f j i S A g m t t t f t t t , MADE THIS 2nd day of Fet>ruar> 
1986tBetu«** DPVglas C. and Betty J. Roberts, party 
j the F** r*n, heritnaft* cried tk*-uiier9 and Property A s s i s t a n c e Corp. , party 
0/ the Second pari, hareina^at c&d the "ityrr* 
S f l t n e f i f t t l , Tfctf ta t^meideretiam * I 2 0 0 0 , - 0 0 fo the Seller 
m hand paid by the Xyrr. receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the said Seller hereby grants to 
the Buyer the right and option to purchase within 7 day* from the date hereof ALL 
of Lot 71, Willow Stream Estates § 5, accordm to the 
official plat thereof on file and of record In#the office 
of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
hereinafter called "8021 Erique Way". 
// the Buyer dc*res to aerate the said option and shall, u.\thn the said penod so no*\fy the 
Seller in writing, which nonce may be served personally upon the Seller ot hjt at the Sellers duelling 
house or usual place of abode or be tent by mail addressed thereto, withm such period, thu option shall 
' th*n h*mm* A M+d^^&z***^-*?^^ £w she ^sskr *zj frw*J«~« xn m T^U ^ « 
and premises under the following conditions 
J The pnee for the said property shall be the sum of I 2 0 0 0 . 0 0 p i US S e e tf2 
of which the amount paid for thu option shall be applied on account 
2 Settlement u to take place at Kruse, Landa & Maycock 620 Kearns Bldg. 
136 S . Mam S t , S a l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 
on the 4 th day of February 19 &f) at 10:00 o'clock^ \t 
which time u of the essence of thu agreement, when the Seller shall deliver a 
warranty deed for the said premises, and the balance of the purchase price is to be paid or secured as 
Buv'er agrees to market for sale 8021 Erique Way at a fair 
market price. Bu>er agrees to pay to seller 25% of net 
profits of any sale buyer accepts, payment made upon the 
closing of any such sale. 
Buyer agrees to assume responsibility for first and second 
mortgage obligations. Seller is obligated to have first 
mortgage payments current through January 31, 1986. 
3 In the event of the Buyer not making settlement m accordance with the terms hereof, the 
payment or payments made on account shall, at the Seller's option, be forfeited at liquidated damages 
for the failure of the Buyer to settle, or be applied on account of the purchase price 
4 The title to be delivered shall be a marketable title end thall be free and clear of all encum 
brancei including municipal liens and assessments and liability for assessments for improvements now 
constructed (eicept as herein stated) thit clause to be operative as of the date of thit agreement, and 
the title is to be subject to all ecittmg rcstnct%ons of record, the Seller, however, guarantees that there 
ate no restrictions in any conivyonce at plans of record arreting the said premises, which will pro 
hibit the use and/or occupancy thereof as Property A s s i s t a n c e Corp. 
and the premises shall be conveyed m the same condition as the tame now are, reasonable wear and 
tear excepted 
5 In the event that such title cannot be made hy the Seller as J>ove, and the Buyer u unwilling 
to accept such title as the Seller can make, then ot Buyer's option, the above payment or payments 
shall be returned to the Buijer, together with the reasonable expenses of esammtng the title and making 
survey, or the Buyer may prosecute any legal or equitable action to whu:h the Buyer may be entitled 
6 Actual possession is to be given to the Buyer on the day of settlement eicept as herein stated 
If the Buyer accepts possession, with the Seller's consent, before the time of scrlement then the SelUr 
shall be allowed by way of adjustment, interest at 0% on the oausnee due horn the date of possesion 
to the date of settlement 
7 Taxis, water rrmts, interest on encumbrancet, property rentals or*d other current charges shall 
be adjusted as of the date of settlement, unless postassion be given prior thereto, in which case all such 
adjustments thaU be made as of thu date of dehrery of poeaastion 
8 The SeUar shsU pay for the irmpmg of the deed and all revenue stamps thereon, if any he 
necessary, but aU searches, title tswmanca and other conveyancing expenses art to be paid for by the 
Bttyer 
> 
. ^ ^ <W*^ ^ s X ^ SSS^to 
;o Upon closing, sellet- agrees to occupy 8021 Erique / u efc"
Way as Tenant for buy^r f >r a period of 90 da>s, or upon premises 
being sold, whichever occurs first. Seller/tenant agrees to 
monthly rental of $800.00 with a Minimum payment of $500.00 per 
month to be paid on the J& of eich month, commencing February, 
1986. Balance due trom any shortage of monthly rental will be 
deducted from seller/tenant's shate of proceeds from the sale of 
8021 Erique Way. This agreement contingent upon Eagar & Co., Realtor, 
removal o£ exclusive listing and Commission for btiw r. 
^ y , ru   
u/ . , 
17* words 'SELLEIC and 'BlTftlT u >L. 
Plural and nngutar
 nutrhff ^ J ^ ^ ^ " " T ? ' ^ * COn^igd ° ™ > * * 
potations, m n f W
 m / r t W f | f m i f ^ f " " ^ ' ml fW ,„, ,„ „ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
« ^ « « ^ o f ^ 5 r f ^ C<MJe«U*"< ^.rrrwrW, ,
 In< ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
In 3Hitam SBfcreo/. 
r ^ i f 
dated thsdeyand^, firm above u^ntten. 
si utM IULD) u n oajvuuo 
IN Tin FNESCNCI or 
w«i«»A«,i ,„,
 IUfuotrt signatures 
' s, 
fi s; 
For: PROPERTY ASSISTANCE CORP 
